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TOWARDS AN ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF 
POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY ACCORDING 
TO THE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMON GOOD 




1. Introduction: for a politics focused on the Aristotelian ethical 
notion of a «good life»
In Classical Greece, the response to the Socratic question «how ought we 
to live» was central to the ethical debate. There was the conviction that 
a certain way of life was better than others regardless of personal tastes 
and interests. Aristotle considered that man, along with all other species, 
sought perfection and that would only happen on fully attaining the 
self -fulfilment of their essence. This path for seeking perfection was led 
through the very core of family household communities in the city and 
implied the fulfilment of a «happy and good life» (Aristotle, 1998, 22).
This «happy and good life» was not a life spent satisfying random, 
disordered desires, as Aristotle defended that the desires of man had 
to be cultivated and directed towards that which truly constituted the 
real goal of happiness. The «happy and good life» was a life that didn’t 
result from the simple life in community but rather from the practice 
of «good actions». In order to attain the happiness of life in the com-
munity, man had to acquire this «civic virtue» that consisted of follow-
ing the virtues inscribed in his spiritual nature. The best regime for 
governing the city is one which allows citizens «to perform the best 
actions and live happily». This way to reach happiness emerged out of 
the complementarity between political, practical living and the con-
templative, philosophical life through exercising the virtues of courage, 
justice and prudence (Aristotle, 1998, 483).
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Contemporary world seems to have relegated the ethical debate to 
the private domain in a completely different way, implementing its 
socio -economic order on a basis of axiological neutrality with radical 
autonomy of civic values. Is such a separation justified in the political 
philosophy of Aristotle who, contrary to that which had been affirmed 
by Plato (Plato, 1987, 363 -410), defends that «the virtues of the good 
citizen and the good man are not absolutely identical» (Aristotle, 1998, 
197)? Is it feasible that we might be «good citizens» without becoming 
«good persons»? Might we be able to establish an economic -political 
order aiming at happiness and wellbeing without maintaining the 
unity between ethical and civic values and without cultivating educa-
tion to perform good deeds that provide the common good of justice 
and equality (Aristotle, 1998, 23)?
2. Correlation between ethics, religion and politics to promote a good 
life
Within the scope of this distinction introduced by Aristotle, the philos-
opher Leo Strauss considers that citizenship represents a legal -political 
bond between an individual and a political community, which estab-
lishes reciprocal social and economic duties and rights that do not 
depend on belonging to any particular language, religion or ethnic 
group. Contrary to the meaning attributed to «good citizen», which 
entirely depends on the regime, the meaning of «good man» is always 
and everywhere the same. Hence, the «good man» is identical to the 
«good citizen» only under the best regimes (Strauss, 1957, 343 -368).
Therefore, the meaning of «citizen, necessarily, differs in each 
regime» (Aristotle, 1998, 189) because a «good citizen» is the one who 
complies with all civic requirements and this does not amount to a 
synonym for complying with every moral demand. These moral 
demands do not reflect the utilitarian and pragmatic impositions of 
any particular political regime, but rather enclose an ontological dimen-
sion and refer to principles that are inherent in the process of guaran-
teeing human dignity at any time and in any place. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that, if in a democratic regime, the citizen is an 
TOWARDS AN ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF POLITICS AND THE ECONOMY | 75
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL VALUES | VOLUME I | NÚMERO 1 | JUN. 2018
individual with the capacity to participate in the administration of jus-
tice and government, like the politician who governs, citizens have to 
establish the connection between their civic and ethical virtues.
However, returning to the Aristotelian distinction, we verify that it 
provides a classification of regimes, in accordance with the qualitative 
scale of their merits: depending on whether they are good or bad, 
straight or deviant, in accordance with the extent to which they adapt 
to the true goal of political life, which is the promotion of virtue and 
happiness of citizens through good legislation (Aristotle, 1998, 529-
-531). Although a political community is not entirely made up of good 
men, citizens ought to duly comply with their functions and that is 
their contribution to the perfect city. Furthermore, Aristotle recognises 
that responsible governors and rulers ought to have the civic virtues 
of the good citizen and the ethical virtues of the good man. Besides 
being a good citizen, the politician ought to be a prudent man (Aris-
totle, 1998, 197). The wisdom of practical knowledge enables the ruler 
to appropriately exercise the ability to command over the ruled, who 
are at least required to be good citizens (Aristotle, 1998, 537). In the 
rational dimension of man lies the ultimate purpose which consists of 
not only being a good citizen, but also a good man.
Therefore, according to Aristotle, the final goal of political life is 
virtue (Aristotle, 1998, 203 -205) and, to this extent, the best regime is 
that which does not only strive for its own self -perpetuation but which 
is fundamentally concerned with the common good and it is within 
this context that Aristotle identifies the group of the correct regimes 
and determines those deviating from this standard (Aristotle, 1998, 
211).
3. Law as an orientation of reason for the common good and the 
private good of blissfulness
Within the line of Aristotle’s thinking, which presents the good life and 
happiness as the objectives of human action and following Saint Augus-
tine, who describes human restlessness in the quest for stillness and 
divine peace, Saint Thomas Aquinas maintains that the ultimate 
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purpose of human life arises out of happiness or beatitude. In order to 
attain this state of perfection, there ought to be a perfect relationship 
between the internal principles of action, i.e., nature and habits, and 
the external principle of action that motivates man directly towards 
good, i.e., God, who acts through Law or with the assistance of Grace 
(Aquinas, 2005, 524 -525).
By means of the law and reason inscribed in human nature, God 
instructs and guides human actions in the direction of the beatitude 
leading to full enjoyment of life and the attaining of private and com-
mon happiness. As man is not only a natural being and human beings 
orient themselves towards the transcendent spirit, there is, therefore, 
the need for a special revelation that adds to both natural law and 
human right the divine law revealed in the Holy Scriptures. In this way, 
law is defined as the orientation of reason towards the common good 
and towards the private good (Aquinas, 2005, 527 -528).
According to this perspective, individuals cannot effectively achieve 
virtue, they may only warn and counsel but, if such warnings are 
spurned, they lack the coactive power that the law holds, to enable such 
a purpose. On the other hand, the people or public person who are 
responsible for applying penalties wield such power, and therefore 
become the only ones who can legislate (Aquinas, 2005, 525 -526). How-
ever, this proclamation in «favour of positive law» only becomes pos-
sible because God has infused it in the human mind so that it would 
be naturally known (Aquinas, 2005, 528).
Men participate in the divine creation of law through the making of 
human laws, which consists in finding the right elements according to 
the divine and natural law. In this context, the law is a necessary and 
effective part of the return of man to God as, in reality «the whole 
community of the universe is governed by divine reason» (Aquinas, 
2005, 529). By participating in divine providence, the rational creature 
receives, from the eternal law, a particular inclination towards fair 
actions, and that does not stem only from nature but also from individ-
ual will (Aquinas, 2005, 530). This participation of the rational being in 
the eternal law goes by the name of natural law. In turn, human law 
consists of the establishing of rules that apply natural law to concrete 
situations, i.e., the principles of natural law should serve the common 
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good and need to be correspondingly clear and adapted to the respec-
tive prevailing time and space (Aquinas, 2005, 532 -534).
In addition to natural law and human law, Saint Thomas thus pre-
sents the need for a divine law imposed by God to direct and guide 
human life in a just and fair way, because human life is structured 
according to the purpose of eternal beatitude, which exceeds the nat-
ural capacity of its faculties (Aquinas, 2005, 535). In keeping with this 
argument, there is a distinction between human legislation, carried out 
in accordance with the natural capacities, and divine legislation, which 
is perfect and also capable of judging internal actions and every type 
of wrongdoing which escape the reaches of human law. The perfection 
of virtue requires man to be ruled by another law.
However, can we deduce that, in Saint Thomas, human law only 
refers to the conditions of the «good citizen» in some specific regime 
and that, in order to become a «good man» and order oneself around 
the goal of eternal beatitude, it would be necessary to obey not only 
the laws of man but also the law of God? Does the law, understood as 
the prescription of practical reason on behalf of a leader governing a 
particular, so called perfect community, refer only to the civic virtue of 
the good citizen in any specific regime or does it also encapsulate the 
ethical virtue of the good man? Is divine law required to enlighten 
human law only for believers or for all men whose final purpose is to 
attain the good life, the common good and eternal beatitude?
Furthermore, how might we say that the «purpose of the law is to 
make humans good» when Thomas Aquinas considers that human 
goodness stems from virtue and that this stems from God «who infuses 
it in us, without our awareness»? And once it is out of kindness that 
men obey the law, considering that goodness comes prior to the law, 
how might we say that it is the law that renders human good? And in 
what way may the law make good those who believe that by obeying 
it, contribute to the common welfare, but do not act correctly for their 
own good? Finally, how do we conceive that making men good is 
within the scope of the law when we know that certain laws are tyran-
nical, failing to ensure the wellbeing of the subjects and seeking their 
own purposes instead?
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4. The Thomist distinction between «absolutely good men» and 
«good men within the order of a particular regime»
The response given by Thomas Aquinas to these questions and objec-
tions corresponds not to any distinction between the civic virtues of 
good citizens and the moral virtues of good men but rather between 
the moral virtue regulated by the divine justice of good men and the 
civic virtue of good men as regards a specific regime on the assumption 
that the virtue of the subjects arises out of submitting to their rulers 
through obedience to the law, even when it is tyrannical and in the 
recognition that, in this case, humans are not absolutely good but rel-
atively good within the scope of any particular regime (Aquinas, 2005, 
543).
This correspondingly reflects the position of Saint Thomas Aquinas 
in which the only regime able to make men absolutely good is that in 
which there is a coincidence between civic virtue and ethical virtue. 
Thus, he accepts that the ruler may not possess these two virtues and 
that, in such a case, the best form of government elected by all may 
rapidly deteriorate into the worst. Royal government is the best regime 
for the people as long as it does not become corrupted. However, due 
to the great power the king possesses, it is also true that his government 
easily turns into tyranny whenever the virtue of those holding power, 
fail to attain perfection. What, however, happens is that there are few 
holding perfect virtue since it is only granted to those who know how 
to meditate on divine law, always in fear of and obedient to God (Aqui-
nas, 2005, 768).
Why is the justice of divine law insistently referred to? In fact, the 
power of deciding between good and evil does not belong to man but 
only to God. However, reason is the site of its discernment and the inter-
locutor in this moral order is human freedom and hence moral virtue 
appears as a conflict between the «liberty» (of the subject) and the «man-
dated rule» (of God). To this extent, moral virtue cannot be approached 
within the framework of an absolute sovereignty of reason as there is no 
total autonomy of reason with the total absence of revelation.
Therefore, the formulation of the role of reason and faith in estab-
lishing the moral laws that refer to the specific behaviours relative to 
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the specific subject, to the others and to the world of things, implies 
divine revelation conveying a specific and determined, universally 
valid and permanent moral content. This correspondingly means that 
the word of God is not limited to handing down some exhortation that 
autonomous reason would only have to complete with the specific, 
truly objective, normative determinations, i.e., appropriate to the con-
crete historical context, but that it needs to be assimilated and assumed 
in the exercise of human virtues and of the virtues of grace expressed 
within the context of the old law.
Thus, the light of natural reason, which distinguishes the good from 
the evil, proves nothing more than the remains of the divine light in 
each one of us. This is termed natural law once the reason which stip-
ulates it arises out of human nature. This classical concept of «natural 
law» and its consequences for approaching moral virtue derives from 
the Greeks (the Stoics and Aristotle) and was assumed by the Holy 
Fathers and, above all, by Saint Thomas before undergoing a univer-
salising expansion in the Modern Age through «universal natural law». 
Neo -Scholasticism adopts this as a predominantly abstract and a -tem-
poral orientation, triggering reactions of resistance and disagreements 
from the contemporary fields of the Ethics of Philosophy and Moral 
Theology. However, this does not correspond to the original position 
of Saint Thomas that we are dealing with here.
5. The complementarity between natural law and the law of the 
revealed Spirit for establishing the perfect social order
In this sense, natural law is a participation of eternal law in the rational 
being to the extent that reason is enlightened by Divine Revelation 
and by faith (Augustini, 1891, 621 -622). The law God handed down to 
His chosen people, beginning with the commandments given in the 
Sinai mountain, the same natural law, which Saint Thomas identified 
as the reason of divine wisdom and which drives everything to its 
appropriate end (Aquinas, 2005, 547), is completed and perfected by 
the new law of the Spirit or the «inner law», that is the «law of perfec-
tion and liberty». Through human law, man participates in divine rule 
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and, thus, the juridical structure instituted by Thomas Aquinas respects 
the structure of human existence, harmonising the personal reality 
with the perfect natural community that may correspond to peoples 
and nations.
Natural law, as inscribed into rational nature, favours the dignity of 
the human individual, establishing the foundations for their funda-
mental rights and duties, without entering into opposition against the 
singularity of human beings and their individual uniqueness. Due to 
the attention contemporary men pay to history and culture, the immu-
tability of natural law has now been called into question. However, its 
own justified existence can only ever continue due to the existence, in 
man, of permanent and transcendental structural features that are 
beyond historical and cultural variations. There is no opposition 
between the universal character of natural law and the necessary adap-
tation or enculturation of the moral norms in different historical and 
cultural contexts.
In this way, God cares diligently for all of His creation (Sab. 7, 22; 8, 
11), even while for man God set a different path: not based on the exte-
rior, through the laws of physical nature, but rather from within, 
through the reason that recognises the eternal Law of God through 
natural light and so it is capable to indicate the fair and just path of free 
will. (reason and will, sense and liberty). Therefore, the natural law 
implies universality given that this is inscribed in the rational nature 
of people. Owing to the nature held in common by all beings, man 
tends towards good because every living form seeks for its own appro-
priate preservation. However, beyond this, there are special inclina-
tions, man share with irrational animals, such as sexual intercourse and 
the education of offspring. Finally, rooted in its own appropriate 
rational nature, there is in man an inclination towards good, towards 
the knowledge of the truth of God and towards the knowledge about 
the essential facets of life in society such as avoiding ignorance and not 
offending others (Aquinas, 2005, 564 -565). Running counter to a con-
ception of pure nature and based upon the Christian anthropology of 
the creation of man in the image and similar to God, Thomas Aquinas 
defends the notion of the natural desire of God, with its satisfaction not 
occurring either in this or the next life only through gnostic cognitive 
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effort, but it occurs with the support of grace in the glory of eternal 
beatitude.
Once the rational soul shapes man, each individual tends to natu-
rally act according to reason, this means the same as stating «acting 
virtuously». Every virtuous act belongs to the natural law and provides 
the foundations for the development of the «co -naturalness» between 
man and the true good, which is essential for man to be able to «under-
stand the will of God, what is good, what is pleasing to him and what 
is perfect» (Rom. 12, 2). According to Saint Thomas, these are the nec-
essary features to a social order that may be relative or absolutely good, 
depending on whether the law is governed by divine justice or not, and 
that reflects in the tension between the two fundamental juridical 
orders: the «rights of peoples», which universally derive from natural 
rational law, and the «civil law», which derives from the same law but 
through particular determinations in accordance with the specific char-
acteristics of each respective State.
Thus, the question looms: in what ways does human law establish 
this division? If it is a fact that natural law is common to all nations, 
what is the role and framework for positive law? Thomas Aquinas 
holds no doubt about the need for the division of positive law into the 
rights of peoples and civil law. As the rights of people are rational and 
natural to man (natural law), this is a universal law and, therefore, man 
may easily find themselves in agreement in relation to the law. The 
same is no longer the case for the civil law determined by each State, 
corrupt and imperfect to a greater or lesser extent. Once again, there is 
an explicit distinction between the level of the law that seeks the abso-
lute good of man («good men») and that relating to a specific political 
regime («good citizens»), even while the latter always gets built out of 
the former. What determines the quality of the regime emerging out of 
this conjugation is the virtuous capacity of whoever enacts the legisla-
tion, which depends on the discovery (reason) and the exercise (will) 
of human virtues and acceptance (faith) and practice (charity) of the 
theological virtues. Thomas Aquinas’ proposal for a perfect social order 
requires conciliation between the political law associated with a certain 
regime and the law of universal ethics which is common to all men and 
which guarantees the good life and happiness and whose full 
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attainment demands the enlightenment from the grace of the Spirit 
(political, ethical and religious).
How might we conceive this unity between politics, ethics and reli-
gion in determining those values and actions that lead to the good life 
and to the good man within the dynamic context of secularization that 
fosters the separation between political power and spiritual power and 
develops moral autonomy?
6. Political liberalism and axiological neutrality: privatisation of 
ethical and religious values
The secular dynamics, which encapsulates the separation between 
political power and religious power, is a democratic value that reflects 
in the respect for religious freedom (González -Carvajal, 2003, 17). How-
ever, secularism and laicism pervert this dynamics when they take root 
as ideologies, defending that religion should withdraw from the public 
space and remain confined to the private domain of the conscience. 
Within the same scope, political liberalism also advocates a privatisa-
tion of ethical values and axiological neutrality. According to this the-
ory ethical values must be relegated to the private sphere of conscience 
and mustn’t interfere with political and economic actions.
The Classical Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, and 
the Scholastic philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, made an effort 
to introduce ethical criteria into the economic world, for example, with 
laws over fair prices and prohibitions on usury. During the 16th and 17th 
centuries, traders and economic actors still paid attention to the reflec-
tions of these moralists within the context of a generalised concern over 
justice. However, from the 18th century onwards, the discourses of eco-
nomic science and economic ethics began to undergo development in 
parallel and today economic actors seek out and consult specialists in 
finance and marketing but they do not consult moralists, and they put 
forward Prince by Machiavelli as essential reading for the directors of 
great corporations (González -Carvajal, 1998, 75).
Capitalism led to a rupture between economics and ethics, main-
taining that economic life is governed by natural laws analogous to 
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those ruling the physical, chemical and biological domains. Letting 
everything function in freedom emerges as all that is needed for har-
monious development. It no longer makes sense to apply the ethical 
categories of justice and injustice to an economic movement that is only 
governed by the technical categories of efficiency and inefficiency, dis-
regarding the moral categories of good and evil. The philosopher Adam 
Smith, often heralded as the father of liberal capitalism, defends that 
profit is the drive of economic activities and that, in an invisible way, 
this dynamism will bring together all of the individual interests in the 
pursuit of the common good. What happens in practice is that this 
dynamism has not developed as first foreseen and the economic world 
has become cruel and implacable, denying the moralists any right to 
any reflection on economic matters and questions.
Any social order based on striving for a good life requires the decon-
struction of the sense of dichotomy and the modern opposition between 
the public sphere and the private domain in political, economic, ethical 
and religious terms. If, on the one hand, science, politics, economics 
and culture have their own particular and autonomous laws as well as 
specific methods, in which the objective does not involve responding 
in any ultimate and incorporating way to questions about the origin 
and meaning of reality and its essence, on the other hand, they assume 
an origin and a meaning to that essence, which is thematised by the 
ethical -religious experience and, in this sense, there is also no radical 
distinction. The objective of all human activity ought to be the common 
good and so as to ensure this, economy also needs subordinating to 
ethics through the mediation of political action (González -Carvajal, 
1998, 81).
While defining the competences of particular determinations of 
political organisations and economic activities fall beyond their scope, 
religion and ethics, on behalf of the common good of the community 
and human dignity, cannot but take on critical roles in society as well 
as defining an upstream matrix of values for organising the respective 
society they belong to and not scaling back their presence to some mere 
internal and individual sentiment. Clearly, the political power super-
vising the economy should be a democratic power, elected by the peo-
ple and subject to control by the Constitution. Equally clearly, not all 
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of the solidarity ethical demands should be included in planning the 
active participation of all social powers as this might lead to undermin-
ing the incentives for generating wealth and ending up harming the 
very values that require defending. However, economic activities, 
which experience tensions between unlimited needs and finite 
resources, ought to serve man and their purpose of a good, cooperative 
and fraternal life (social peace).
7. The separation between economic values and moral values
The separation of economic values from moral values was driven by 
the liberal economic thinking of Adam Smith in his most famous work, 
published in 1776, entitled An inquiry into the nature and causes of the 
wealth of nations, more simply known as The Wealth of Nations. In this 
study, Smith defends that human beings are driven by a natural desire 
for self -perfection and that, in a free market, despite each individual 
acting only in accordance with their own interests, this brings about an 
efficient situation in which everybody benefits: «the natural efforts of 
each individual to improve their own conditions constitute, whenever 
allowed to exercise them in freedom and security, such a powerful 
principle that, alone and without any assistance, is (…) capable of lead-
ing society to wealth and prosperity» (Smith, 2014, 63).
This new concept fundamentally challenged traditional moral val-
ues, which perceived society as an organisation that sought to attain 
the happiness not of individuals but rather of the collective as a whole. 
According to the ideas of Adam Smith, each individual acted in order 
to maximise their own personal wellbeing and this striving for indi-
vidual wellbeing led to a positive social wellbeing, therefore, the whole 
would be greater than the sum of the parts. We would note however 
that the premises set out by Adam Smith do not extend to considera-
tions about redistribution or social equality, which certainly hinders 
their association with the concept of public wellbeing.
The ideas of Adam Smith completely changed the meaning of the 
classical values: generosity happened to be seen as some undesirable 
value as this undermined the power of the incentives which allowed 
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individuals to become “efficient” in the accumulation of wealth. 
According to Smith, «it is not by the goodwill of the butcher, the brewer 
or the baker that we should expect to dine but rather the consideration 
that they hold for their own interests» (Smith, 2014, 95). The search for 
personal profit thus became the drive of economic activity. To give 
absolute value to private property rights, underpinning the capitalist 
ideology, led economic actors to give up on concerns around the com-
mon good and to dedicate themselves exclusively to their own personal 
wealth.
Liberal economic thinking, founded by Adam Smith, was adopted 
on a massive scale by western societies due to the power of its logical 
and rational arguments. Simultaneously, this economic system enabled 
political actors “to turn a blind eye on” problems surrounding social 
justice, so, if an individual lacked the access to their basic needs this 
resulted from their own laziness and lack of capacity for labour. We 
would further point to how the rupture with the Aristotelian and 
Judaeo -Christian values represented a key factor in liberal economic 
growth and expansion as the revaluing of the accumulation of wealth 
turned into the idolatry of consumption. Therefore, the exclusive search 
for individual wellbeing became not only acceptable but even desirable 
on the pretext that, in overall terms, this would lead to a richer and 
happier society.
Meanwhile, modern economy only deepened the divide between 
economic values and moral values: while pre -modern economic theory 
considered that there was an inherent morality in the economic choices 
made by individuals, who ought to have common sense and control 
over their instinctive greed, modern economy abstained from positing 
any ethical considerations and ambitions over improving on the social 
wellbeing. The capitalist economic system no longer aims to build a 
better world for all according to some universal value but rather at the 
possibility that each individual might attain what is good in whatever 
way this is presented. As a consequence, many people today are no 
longer searching for the Good, actually, they want to feel good instead 
(wellbeing).
The school of neoliberal economic thinking, which today predomi-
nates worldwide, does not hold any ambition over building a world in 
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which man might enjoy a «happy and good life». On the contrary, this 
strand of thought accepts man as he is and nurtures his individualism, 
which leads to their indifference towards their peers. In addition to the 
search for personal gain and profit, this economic dynamism under-
goes regulation according to free competition, in which the owner of 
the means of production holds absolute power over them without the 
State’s interference in their management, and is regulated by the notion 
that this non -intervention of the public powers does not lead to chaos 
but rather to harmony because capitalism self -regulates through free 
market and laws of supply and demand. Obviously, as Gonzáles-
-Carvajal highlights, in no part of the world did capitalism take root in 
any pure format and, after World War II, in the majority of cases, and 
due to the influence of the British economist John Maynard Keynes, 
societies have evolved towards a social market economy, following the 
recognition that capitalism is not self -regulating and is also unable to 
attain the common good requiring the State intervention for such pur-
pose (González -Carvajal, 1998, 102).
The serious displacement between the economy and the ethics stems 
not from the idea that companies need to obtain benefits to continue 
functioning but rather to the concept that their functioning is not for 
the common good of society but rather to acquire more and more profit. 
The subordination of the economy to ethics through the mediation of 
politics should hold the exclusive objective of harmonising the interests 
of the diverse social groups within the framework of the common good. 
The political community exists to seek out this common good acting 
neither mechanically nor despotically but using a moral power based 
on freedom and on personal responsibility.
In 1987, Amartya Sen theorised on the errors arising out of an econ-
omy dissociated from ethics. According to this author, there is a con-
sciously non -ethical character in modern economy, which gave rise to 
consumer society. This thinker refers to how economy derives from two 
very different origins, both interrelated with the politics that strives to 
promote the common good: on the one hand, the question of how to 
live (interconnected with ethics); on the other hand, that which we may 
term logistics, which consists in seeking out the appropriate means for 
the purposes of fostering the good of man. Unfortunately, states 
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Amartya, modern economy has developed greatly within the scope of 
this second facet and increasingly overlooking the former in such a way 
that we witness today a sheer distance between economy and ethics.
Amartya contests the theory of Adam Smith that holds personal 
interest to be the drive of economy. The former thinker maintains that 
there is no evidence that the maximisation of personal interest leads to 
better economic conditions and he gives Japan as an example with its 
free market economy in which «the systematic deviation of behaviour 
due to personal interest towards the behaviour based on rules – duty, 
loyalty and goodwill – have been extremely important to achieving 
economic efficiency at both individual and group levels, contributing 
decisively to the industrial success of the country» (Sen, 2012, 13).
8. The separation between the State and moral values
In 1971, John Rawls published his work A Theory of Justice and contrib-
uted to changing the paradigm of the role of the State in society. Rawls 
maintained that the state was responsible for guaranteeing that all cit-
izens were free to strive for their ethical values just as so long as they 
did not interfere with the liberty of the remaining individuals. Did this 
theory institute the principle of State neutrality and did the State 
thereby renege social good?
The ideas introduced by Rawls changed the paradigm for states in 
the western world: beyond the duty of being tolerant and understand-
ing, they were able to hold ethical preferences and foster certain moral 
values. What took place involved the reform of the function of the State 
in society, undermining and restricting the moral role of the legislator 
on the grounds that all values are morally acceptable when they respect 
the freedom of other individuals. The duty of the state should remain 
within the boundaries of «guaranteeing conditions of equal religious 
and moral freedom» (Rawls, 2000, 230). Does this position mean aban-
doning the ethical demands of the State’s civil laws?
We know that representative democracy, perfected with instruments 
of direct democracy, must rest upon common human dignity. Addi-
tionally, given that the state is not confessional, we also know that the 
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morality of any religion cannot be the ethical instance inspiring and 
guiding the decisions of civilian legislators. However, we also know 
that the alternative cannot also be juridical positivism, which defends 
that civil laws do not require any ethical groundings nor can it be nat-
ural law (natural objective principle) within the scope that laws are only 
justified through their moral support as external powers for coaction 
in compliance with some social duties that are imposed in an innate 
form onto the ethical conscience or that emerge through rational 
actions. Natural law cannot be accepted as determinant because in 
practice we realise that, on the one hand, there are different and dis-
tinctive conceptions of this very law and, on the other hand, we find 
that the light of reason does not lead to the same conclusions. Finally, 
the fact that some specific religion deems itself the legitimate inter-
preter of natural law also does not get us out of this deadlock (González-
-Carvajal, 1998, 255). What is the best solution for underpinning 
political and economic actions of ethical values that defend the princi-
ple of the good life and human happiness?
We verify that the evolution of the State from a position of «toler-
ance» to one of «neutrality» has contributed towards overshadowing 
the notion of «good life» and common good and created the new reli-
gion of society: consumerism. We may add that the neutrality of Rawls 
opened the door necessary for the legitimation of hedonism. The 
«good life» therefore lost its place in the definition of social wellbeing 
to give way to a society in which the needs are numerous and the 
wants and desires boundless. How do we find a valid response to the 
problem of ethically justifying civil law in a pluralist society such as 
our own?
Furthermore, we may observe how neoliberalism advocates the 
non -intervention of the State in the economy in which there ought to 
be total freedom for business and commerce that enables economic 
growth and social development. From the economic point of view, it 
does not matter whether people are altruists, egoists, hedonists or 
masochists, the only relevant factor is that they hold certain prefer-
ences and follow them. As detailed above, economic theory maintains 
that economic actors are rational and make their choices in complete 
harmony with this principle of rationality. What is also certain is that 
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the vast majority of human choices are not strictly rational even while 
this facet has been broadly ignored by the intellectual economic com-
munity.
Even though some economic models do incorporate the existence 
of «semi -altruistic actors», i.e., individuals who, in addition to seeking 
to maximise their own individual wellbeing, also seek to contribute 
towards the wellbeing of others, the scientific community does not 
generally accept this idea and, as such, it is not included in many of the 
models that serve as guidance and support for economic policies. The 
level of happiness of any society would seem far from ranking as a 
priority objective to contemporary economic theories.
Ought the State to continue legislating and establishing mechanisms 
that correspond to the moral values prevailing in the social consensus 
through religious and cultural sensitivity through civil and penal codes 
or ought the State to abstain from any moralising action in the name of 
religious tolerance and cultural and personal freedom?
Ethics, as philosophy of human action, is part of the nature of man 
and moral questions emerge because we do not live alone: there are 
other people with whom we interact and who have their own wishes 
which do not always coincide with our own and who should also be 
respected. Living within an ethical framework implies considering the 
finitude of the environmental resources on the planet when we have 
to decide what to consume in our daily lives. It involves treating the 
others always as individuals and never as means to achieve anything. 
It also means to feel responsible not only for our own generation but 
also for those still to come in the Aristotelian sense that ethics intercon-
nects with the search for the common good, in his referencing that (…) 
even though there is a single good for each individual in particular and 
for all in general in a State, it would seem that maintaining the good 
belonging to the State results in obtaining and conserving a larger and 
more complete good» (Aristotle, 2004, 20).
Out of the same concern over the correlation between politics, econ-
omy and ethics, Amartya Sen defends how «the economy may be more 
productive should we pay more attention to the ethical considerations 
that mould human behaviour» (Sen, 2012, 12). Additionally, in the same 
sense, Gilles Lipovetsky warns as to the individualism of the 
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hyper -consumerist society in which we live, characterised by unbridled 
greed, by the consumption of goods that reaches well beyond reason-
able levels and by unmeasurable luxury coupled with a significant loss 
of collective values and the concept of the common good (Lipovetsky, 
2015, 11).
Finally, we would reference Luis González -Carvajal for whom the 
solution for unity between politics and ethics should begin with the 
recognition of social pluralism in which there are different moral 
orders such as the Christian, the Liberal and the Marxist but which, 
despite their own distinctive characteristics, overlap around a fairly 
broad basic core of values expressed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (González -Carvajal, 1998, 256). He names this ethical 
heritage shared by all human groups living in a pluralist society as 
«civil ethics».
These ethical values shared across the set of citizens enable their 
peaceful coexistence and should inspire legislation not on the grounds 
of being the ethics of the majority but rather as a shared platform of 
understanding that enables dialogue around the moral justifications 
underpinning the civil laws. However, this shared ethical heritage 
requires enrichment by the contributions from different religions and 
philosophies while in the recognition that not every ethical demand is 
susceptible to conversion into civil laws as such would result in a police 
state. Citing Thomas Aquinas, this Spanish philosopher affirms that 
the laws should not ban all vices but rather only the most serious that 
render coexistence impossible. The remaining ethical demands and 
requirements should be complied with by citizens without any type of 
coaction as only thus do they hold any moral value (González -Carvajal, 
1998, 257).
9. Conclusion: political governance requires the coincidence of the 
«good citizen» virtue with that of the «good man»
While distinguishing civic virtue from moral virtue and considering 
how the virtue of the «good citizen» should belong to all for the citi-
zens’ welfare, and admitting that the virtue of the «good man» may 
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not be common to all, Aristotle concludes that the politician or ruler 
should be a good and prudent man to act with justice and with the 
objective of the common good (Aristotle, 1998, 197). From our analysis 
of the work of Aristotle, we may state that the interpretation attributed 
to his politics as involving some absolute division between the ethical 
and political dimensions of human actions represents a distortion of 
his intent. The purpose of man is happiness but to attain that desire he 
has to integrate religious, moral and political values which aim at 
attaining the common good.
Within a similar sense, Saint Thomas Aquinas also defends that the 
only regime able to make men absolutely good is that in which there 
is a coincidence between civic virtue and ethical virtue in contrast to 
those regimes that aiming only at what is useful and delightful, apply 
laws that only turn men good in a relative way. In a democratic regime, 
in which all citizens hold responsibilities for the social and political 
order, the unity between civic virtue and ethical virtue should take 
place for all so that political and economic actions hold purposes that 
reach beyond individual interest and contribute towards the common 
good and the happiness of all.
Within the scope of the materialist society in which we live, there is 
the generalised opinion that the good and happy life derives from sta-
tus, fame, power, prestige, money and material goods. The concept of 
«good life» in Aristotle, which means a life guided by the spirit and 
moral values, seems to have been lost in the contemporary world, in 
which the profit focused neoliberal economy has prevailed over all 
other areas of life. In general, modern economy no longer aspires to do 
Good and the concept of «good life» was no longer discussed politically 
and economically because, as Aristotle himself stated, the people who 
are motivated by personal ambitions of honour and power no longer 
seem to wish to love, in the community sense, but only wish to be loved 
in the individual sense (Aristotle, 2004, 191).
As emerges out of contemporary reflection, there is an urgency sur-
rounding the rethinking of the moral demands of economic and polit-
ical laws, which should adopt a platform for dialogue over the civil 
ethics based on the consensus established by the Universal Charter of 
Human Rights and the recognition of the importance of caring for our 
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shared home, planet Earth. Contemporary society ought to aim at a 
good life fostering peace, justice and the preservation of the environ-
ment.
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